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Abstract
Background: A novel variant of influenza A (H1N1) is causing a pandemic and, although the illness is
usually mild, there are concerns that its virulence could change through reassortment with other influenza
viruses. This is of greater concern in parts of Southeast Asia, where the population density is high, influenza
is less seasonal, human-animal contact is common and avian influenza is still endemic.
Methods: We developed an age- and spatially-structured mathematical model in order to estimate the
potential impact of pandemic H1N1 in Vietnam and the opportunities for reassortment with animal
influenza viruses. The model tracks human infection among domestic animal owners and non-owners and
also estimates the numbers of animals may be exposed to infected humans.
Results: In the absence of effective interventions, the model predicts that the introduction of pandemic
H1N1 will result in an epidemic that spreads to half of Vietnam's provinces within 57 days (interquartile
range (IQR): 45-86.5) and peaks 81 days after introduction (IQR: 62.5-121 days). For the current published
range of the 2009 H1N1 influenza's basic reproductive number (1.2-3.1), we estimate a median of 410,000
cases among swine owners (IQR: 220,000-670,000) with 460,000 exposed swine (IQR: 260,000-740,000),
350,000 cases among chicken owners (IQR: 170,000-630,000) with 3.7 million exposed chickens (IQR: 1.9
M-6.4 M), and 51,000 cases among duck owners (IQR: 24,000 - 96,000), with 1.2 million exposed ducks
(IQR: 0.6 M-2.1 M). The median number of overall human infections in Vietnam for this range of the basic
reproductive number is 6.4 million (IQR: 4.4 M-8.0 M).
Conclusion: It is likely that, in the absence of effective interventions, the introduction of a novel H1N1
into a densely populated country such as Vietnam will result in a widespread epidemic. A large epidemic
in a country with intense human-animal interaction and continued co-circulation of other seasonal and
avian viruses would provide substantial opportunities for H1N1 to acquire new genes.
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In early 2009 a novel influenza A (H1N1) variant emerged
which spread globally causing the first influenza pan-
demic in over 40 years. The dynamics and impact of this
pandemic are difficult to predict, especially since the
world has changed significantly in 40 years - the global
population has almost doubled, more people live in cit-
ies, people travel more frequently and over longer dis-
tances. These facts will undoubtedly influence the global
pattern of this pandemic, just as geographical heteroge-
neities will result in different local patterns [1]. More than
60% of the world's population live in low-income and
lower-middle income countries, and yet, at the time of
writing only, about 10% of confirmed cases have occurred
in these areas [2,3]. In densely populated low-income
countries, where public health systems, health care serv-
ices and drug availability are all stretched, influenza
H1N1 is likely to be almost impossible to contain result-
ing in a greater number of cases occurring in more vulner-
able populations resulting in a less benign epidemic.
Even more worrying, almost 60% of the world's human
population and over 50% of the world's poultry popula-
tion live in Asia, where highly pathogenic avian influenza
(HPAI) maintains a foothold and seasonal influenza
transmission is complex [4]. Previous pandemics have
demonstrated the potential consequences of reassortment
between human and animal influenza viruses. It is possi-
ble, therefore, that the new H1N1 - itself a reassortant of
swine viruses that had previously reassorted with human
and avian influenza - may follow a similar pattern [5,6].
The new H1N1 variant has already shown that it can be
transmitted from humans to pigs, and we know that the
H5N1 subtype is capable of infecting humans and of suc-
cessfully reassorting with human seasonal influenza
viruses under in vitro and in vivo experimental conditions
[7,8]. As the population is increasing and standards of liv-
ing are improving there has been an increase in livestock
production and thus there is probably more contact
between animals and humans than before. These contacts
offer opportunities for reassortment, and, if a novel virus
with the transmissibility of H1N1 and even a fraction of
the virulence of H5N1 were to emerge, the consequences
would be devastating.
In order to explore the potential impact of influenza A
(H1N1) on a densely populated low-income country, we
developed a mathematical model showing how an influ-
enza A (H1N1) epidemic might progress in Vietnam. We
used this model to estimate the frequency of contact
between H1N1 infected humans and domestic animals in
an attempt to quantify the opportunities for reassortment
between H1N1 and animal influenza viruses.
Methods
Mathematical model
We developed an age-structured gravity model - where
migration rates among sub-populations are balanced such
that there are no changes in the sizes of the sub-popula-
tions - based on traditional susceptible exposed infectious
recovered (SEIR) equations with stochastic migration and
hospitalization processes [9]. The model has geographical
resolution to the province level in Vietnam (64 provinces
in 2007) and tracks infection and mixing in seven age
groups. The incubation period was set at 1.4 days and the
infectious stage was separated into four stages to mimic an
infectious period that is Γ-distributed with a coefficient of
variation equal to 0.5. Mixing and infection among hosts
(humans) in the model occurred at the province level and
depended on the contact rates among the seven age
groups, age-specific susceptibilities, province-specific age
distribution and population density. The basic reproduc-
tive number, denoted by R0, is calculated via a next gener-
ation matrix assuming at most one cross-province
migration event during a single infection [10]. The R0
value described in the text and figures is for Ho Chi Minh
City and assumes that there is no migration from the city
(see supplementary materials, additional file 1, for detail
on the different R0 values that can be computed for this
model). The results are presented for a single case intro-
duced in Ho Chi Minh City, as this is where the first case
was confirmed on 31 May 2009. Infection among animal
populations is not modelled. Model equations and details
of computing the basic reproduction ratio are presented
in the supplementary materials (Additional file 1).
Data sources
We used seven age groups: 0-5 years, 6-15, 16-25, 26-34,
35-49, 50-64 and 65+. Provincial level data on resident
population by age class, number of public and private
hospital beds, number of households, and number of
households raising pigs, chickens, and ducks were derived
from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam. The age-
class specific daily probability of migration between prov-
inces was derived from a 2007 community survey con-
ducted in northern Vietnam [unpublished data, P Horby].
This gave a mean estimate of 1.35% of the population
moving between the provinces each day. This was used as
the lower end of the modelled range, as it is known that
populations closer to urban areas will have much higher
rates of movement. The number of major and minor
roads crossing provincial borders was determined from
1:250,000 road maps and were used to obtain a relative
measure of interprovincial traffic. Internal migration by
air travel was estimated using publicly available flight data
from all airlines operating domestically in Vietnam. The
known daily travel by air and the unknown daily travel by
road were combined to form a scalable migration networkPage 2 of 12
(page number not for citation purposes)
BMC Medicine 2009, 7:43 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/7/43between the provinces of Vietnam where between 1.35%
and 5.00% of the population moved between provinces
on a daily basis.
Transmission and natural history parameters
Age-dependent mixing was included in the model by cre-
ating a contact matrix for seven age groups, using data
from a survey of social contact patterns conducted in 2007
among 865 members of a community in one semi-rural
district of northern Vietnam. Since both epidemiological
and serological data are suggestive of age-dependent sus-
ceptibility to H1N1 infection, an age-dependent suscepti-
bility term was also included [11,12]. This was derived
using data on the age distribution of cases in the USA and
data on age-dependent contact frequency from a Euro-
pean study [13]. We assumed no effect of season on the
transmission of infection or on contact patterns, as influ-
enza seasonality in Vietnam is not well understood, even
in the northern and more temperate part of the country
(unpublished data, PQ Thai).
Since reliable data on the natural history of infection with
H1N1 were not available at the time of writing, we
applied parameters previously estimated for seasonal
influenza. We applied an incubation period with a mean
of 1.4 days [14]. The mean of the Γ-distributed infectious
period was varied between 3.8 days and 5.5 days [15]. The
age-class specific relative probability of hospitalization
was derived from data of the proportion of H1N1 cases
hospitalized in Mexico and the USA. The overall hospital-
ization rate was varied between 0.5% and 1.5% of all
cases, since reported rates of 5%-6% are likely to be biased
by over-ascertainment of severe cases compared to mild
cases. Hospitalization time was set at 5 days [16].
Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity was tested by varying the basic reproduction
ratio (1.2 - 3.1), the duration of infection (3.8 - 5.5 days),
the individual probability of cross-province migration
(1.35% - 5.00% daily probability), the relative amount of
traffic on large roads compared to small roads (one to two
times), and the overall expected hospitalization in the
population (0.5% - 1.5%). One thousand parameter com-
binations were sampled using Latin hypercube sampling,
and sensitivity results are reported for these parameter
samples [17]. The key parameter for this sensitivity analy-
sis is R0, the basic reproductive number. For influenza this
is traditionally estimated between 1 and 3 [18-20] and the
ranges reported so far for novel H1N1 have been 1.2, 1.4
to 1.6, 2.0 to 2.6, and <2.2 to 3.1 [11,21,22]. For the upper
band of our tested range, we used the highest estimate (R0
= 3.1) as opposed to the highest of the upper band 95%
confidence interval (R0 = 3.5).
Full details of data sources, parameter estimation and
model specification are available in the supplementary
materials (Additional file 1).
Results
Epidemic curve and geographic spread
Introducing a single infected case in Ho Chi Minh City,
and simulating the epidemic for one year (over 1000 ran-
domly sampled parameter sets), resulted in a median 6.4
million infections (IQR: 4.4 million - 8.0 million). In the
absence of any intervention, the epidemic would reach
half of Vietnam's provinces in 57 days (IQR: 45-86.5), and
would peak after 81 days (IQR: 62.5-121). Seventy-seven
percent of all cases and 67% of all hospitalizations occur
in the 6-34 year age group. Table 1 shows the range of out-
puts for the model simulations.
The epidemic was dominated by the peaks in Hanoi and
Ho Chi Minh City (Figure 1), Vietnam's most densely
populated metropolitan areas. Both of these provinces are
at least twice as densely populated as any other province
in Vietnam. The interval between the 100-case point in
Ho Chi Minh City and 100-case point in Hanoi is esti-
mated to be about 29 days (IQR: 23-43), but might be
doubled or tripled if a sustained social distancing cam-
paign were able to reduce all contacts by 50%. After the
Hanoi wave passes, the epidemic is expected to tail off
slowly as the disease spreads to less densely populated
rural areas. Figure 2 shows the geographic progression of
the median epidemic in Vietnam; Figure 3 shows the
median epidemic peak times for all the provinces, indicat-
ing an approximate 1-month delay between peaks in the
southern provinces and peaks in the northern provinces.
The epidemic in Vietnam is predicted to cause 58,000 hos-
pitalizations (IQR: 39,000-75,000). The health care sys-
tem would be severely stretched but is unlikely to be
overwhelmed, except in the case of a high-R0 epidemic or
increased virulence. Vietnam currently has a stockpile of
approximately 1.1 million oseltamivir treatment courses
(10 75 mg tablets) and sufficient powder to formulate
another 900,000 treatment courses. This should be ade-
quate for treatment of severe cases but for not mild cases
or for prophylaxis of contacts during a widespread epi-
demic.
Contacts between infected humans and domestic animals
Because of the slow dispersion of the epidemic into rural
areas, the peak exposure of domestic pigs, ducks and
chickens to infected humans occurs during the later
phases of the epidemic. Figure 1A shows the estimated
number of exposures of domestic animals to infected
humans; the highest exposure will be among domestic
chickens and the exposure of all domestic animals willPage 3 of 12
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Model output Minimum Lower quartile Median Upper quartile Maximum
Time to reach 20-case point (days) 9.0 12.0 14.0 19.0 39.0
Time to reach 100-case point (days) 13.0 18.0 22.0 32.0 71.0
Time for 32 provinces to be affected (days) 34.0 45.0 57.0 86.5 314.0
Time for 48 provinces to be affected (days) 41.0 55.0 71.5 112.0 > 1 year
Epidemic peak point (days) 45.0 62.5 80.8 121.0 not reached
Final epidemic size (number of cases) 103,885 4,432,247 6,377,555 8,021,328 9,796,738
Cumulative number hospitalized 594 38,832 58,165 74,935 104.976
Average number of new cases per day over 2-week peak period 1916 88,453 174,804 245,209 326,260
Average number of new hospitalizations per day over 2-week peak 
period
9 779 1,564 2,238 3508
Cumulative number of cases in swine owners 1940 224,208 410,276 671,703 1,159,291
Cumulative number of cases in chicken owners 630 172,731 351,243 632,316 1,174,682
Cumulative number of cases in duck owners 160 23,732 51,131 95,790 182,520
Number of days Hanoi hospitals running at > 150% bed capacity 0 0 0 14 20
Number of days HCMC hospitals running at > 150% bed capacity 0 0 0 0 11
Time from 100-case point in HCMC to 100-case point in Hanoi 12 23 29 43 156
Number of rural cases 16,105 963,791 1,540,008 2,184,359 3,220,171
Number of urban cases 87,780 3,440,732 4,844,258 5,831,431 6,668,559
Number of exposed pigs 3,053 259,328 462,633 737,443 1,239,324
Number of exposed chickens 4,612 1,890,957 3,745,045 6,417,106 11,419,922
Number of exposed ducks 2,319 580,132 1,176,129 2,072,495 3,708,187
Number of infections by age group
0 to 5 years 7,611 366,741 543,858 685,656 832,651
6 to 15 years 35,370 1,211,114 1,617,223 2,031,725 2,609,789
16 to 25 years 30,075 1,312,009 1,837,835 2,212,661 2,599,191
26 to 34 years 22,277 998,079 1,450,723 1,784,407 2,096,515
35 to 49 years 6,067 363,076 627,659 870,774 1,134,289
50 to 64 years 1,920 130,147 232,582 329,305 435,306Page 4 of 12
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Hospitalizations by age group
0 to 5 years 71 4,493 6,766 8,624 12,144
6 to 15 years 113 5,453 7,467 9,481 13,831
16 to 25 years 119 8,128 11,393 14,091 18,991
26 to 34 years 198 13,580 19,932 24,989 33,959
35 to 49 years 81 5,540 9,424 13,345 19,910
50 to 64 years 10 1,284 2,279 3,310 5,262
65 years and over 2 393 721 1,079 1,792
Table 1: Median, quartile and minimum - maximum values for selected outputs of one year of model simulation. (Continued)Page 5 of 12
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(A) The range of possible epidemics in VietnamFigure 1
(A) The range of possible epidemics in Vietnam. The graph summarizes 500 simulated epidemics and resets their peaks 
to day zero so they can be compared on the same time axis. The red line shows the median number of infected persons. The 
medium gray region shows the interquartile range. The light gray region shows the 95% confidence interval based on the 
parameter ranges chosen via Latin hypercube sampling. The confidence band width is primarily determined by R0. The three 
dotted lines show the median number of exposed animals during the epidemic. (B) Median number of new cases by day, 
with day zero corresponding to the epidemic peak. Stacked bar graph has dark gray bars for Ho Chi Minh City, medium 
gray bars for Hanoi and light gray bars for the remaining 62 provinces.
BMC Medicine 2009, 7:43 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/7/43peak roughly 1 month after the peak in Ho Chi Minh City
and shortly after the epidemic peak in Hanoi. Note that
the tail phase of the epidemic wanes slowly and that a sig-
nificant number of chickens, ducks and pigs remain
exposed for up to 2 months after the human epidemic has
peaked in Hanoi (Figure 4).
In total, the epidemic simulations estimate a median
410,000 cases among swine owners (IQR: 220,000 -
670,000) with 460,000 exposed swine (IQR: 260,000-
740,000), a median 350,000 cases among chicken owners
(IQR: 170,000-630,000) with 3.7 million exposed chick-
ens (IQR: 1.9 M-6.4 M), and a median 51,000 cases
among duck owners (IQR: 24,000 - 96,000), with 1.2 mil-
lion exposed ducks (IQR: 0.6 M-2.1 M).
Effect of public health interventions
By restricting contacts in the 6-15 age group, school clo-
sures were modelled but showed little effect on the pro-
gression of the epidemic. Even a comprehensive strategy
of restricting all contacts within this age group would only
delay the epidemic peak by a few days and result in no
fewer cases. Any realistic restriction of flights between Ho
Chi Minh City and Hanoi (< 2 weeks) had little or no
effect on geographic spread or the total number of cases.
Monitoring incoming international flights and multiple
introductions was not modelled.
Sensitivity analysis
Like all epidemic models, the highest sensitivity is to R0.
All severity indices of the epidemic - total number of cases,
peak incidence and total number of hospitalizations - rise
steadily with the R0 value, or, in general, with the trans-
missibility of the virus (top panels, Figure 5). The most
important feature of the model is that with increasing R0
the epidemic becomes more rural. An increase in the pre-
dicted transmissibility of novel H1N1 in Vietnam results
not only in more infections, but in a higher proportion of
infection among rural populations and among those rais-
ing pigs, ducks and chickens domestically (bottom panels,
Figure 5). The model is not very sensitive to the other
parameters tested: the duration of the infection, the
amount of migration between the provinces, the hospital-
ization rate or the relative amount of traffic on large roads
versus small roads.
Discussion
The first cases of H1N1 were detected in Vietnam on 31
May 2009 and by mid-July there were more than 100 con-
firmed cases with probable community transmission that
Geographic spread of swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) in VietnamFigure 2
Geographic spread of swine-origin influenza A (H1N1) in Vietnam. Case numbers in each province are medians from 
1000 model simulations. See additional file 2 for corresponding animation.Page 6 of 12
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wide epidemic. We have used a mathematical model to
explore how the epidemic might progress in the absence
of interventions and have estimated the number of pigs,
ducks and chickens that might be exposed to infected
humans during the epidemic. Employing mathematical
modelling for such a forecasting exercise comes with
many caveats. Of these, the most important are that real
individuals are heterogeneous in behaviour and transmis-
sion, that human behaviour can change as a result of the
severity of the epidemic and that the spatial dimensions of
transmission have many nested levels that may or may
not alter the progression of the epidemic on a larger scale
[23,24]. We used a 'patch model' with coarse province-
level spatial resolution for simplicity of model develop-
ment and rapid computation; the model results should,
therefore, be viewed as rough estimates of the epidemic's
impact in Vietnam on a year-long time scale.
The most important caveat in our analysis is that the true
basic reproductive number is not known; we used a con-
servative estimate, between 1.2 and 3.1, based on early
measurements taken in Mexico, USA and Japan, and we
stress that the R0 for Vietnam may be higher than these
estimates. For an R0 value of 4.0, our model predicted a
total of 13.3 million cases among humans; for an R0 value
of 5.0, 16.6 million cases were predicted. Unfortunately,
the uncertainty in Vietnam's R0 will not be resolved until
we analyse the progression of cases from the first wave of
this pandemic.
Although the model predicts substantially more cases
than have so far been reported from other H1N1 affected
countries, the clinical illness is predominantly mild and,
therefore, reported H1N1 cases to date reflect only a small
proportion of the total number of cases. Our modelled
epidemic affects a median of 7.4% of the population
Timing of provincial epidemic peaks based on the distance from the nearest airport to the capital cityF gure 3
Timing of provincial epidemic peaks based on the distance from the nearest airport to the capital city. The 
model does not take sub-provincial population structure into account, and the epidemic's progression is determined primarily 
by south-to-north movement rather than distance to the airport network. Binh Thuan has an early peak because it lies in a 
densely populated part of southern Vietnam. The Lai Chau peak, as estimated by our model, probably occurs too early. Lai 
Chau is remote and sparsely populated, but its adjacency to the Dien Bien Phu airport causes the model to predict an early epi-
demic peak.Page 7 of 12
(page number not for citation purposes)
BMC Medicine 2009, 7:43 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/7/43(IQR: 5.2-9.3%). This rate is below the figures for previous
pandemics and might be considered too low given the
high transmissibility of this virus in some settings and the
expectation that most of the population would have no
immunity [12]. Due to the low probability of hospitaliza-
tion, it is unlikely that the health sector as a whole will be
over-whelmed in the scenario outlined in this model.
However, there is considerable variation in reported hos-
pitalization rates for H1N1 and the estimate of 1% that we
have used is considerably lower than the maximum of 6%
[25]. As elsewhere, the number of intensive care beds is
limited in Vietnam and occupancy is routinely at maxi-
mum; therefore intensive care capacity is likely to be easily
overwhelmed. Also, although Vietnam has impressive
health indicators for its economic status - the population
may have vulnerabilities, such as under-nutrition in chil-
dren, which might result in a greater number of severe
cases than observed elsewhere.
Containment does appear to have been temporarily suc-
cessful in some countries (Mexico and Japan) but not in
others (Australia and the USA). The reasons for these dif-
ferences are undoubtedly complex, but successful case
detection, isolation and treatment, quarantine and chem-
oprophylaxis of contacts, and social distancing measures,
may all have an effect on the results. In our model, school
closures did not make a substantial difference to the epi-
demic progression, although substantial decreases in con-
tact frequency across all age groups would delay the time
course of the epidemic. School outbreaks have been a
major feature in the early stages of this pandemic, and it is
possible that our model underestimates the role of the
range of contacts and susceptibility of school-age children
on the epidemic dynamics. School closures did seem to be
effective in Kobe, Japan, during 11-24 May 2009, but this
may have reflected the low number of overall infections in
Japan at that time (between four and 345 confirmed
cases) [26]. In the UK, a plateau in consultation rates
appears to have coincided with the closure of schools for
the annual summer holidays [27]. Previous work suggests
that school closure can modify peak attack rates and may
result in a modest reduction of the final number of cases,
Geographic timeline of chicken exposure during an influenza epidemic in VietnamFigure 4
Geographic timeline of chicken exposure during an influenza epidemic in Vietnam. The numbers of chicken expo-
sures are medians from 1000 models simulations. Duck and pig exposures were highly correlated with chicken exposures, geo-
graphically and temporally. Note that because of rounding and fractional cases, some sparsely-populated provinces may have a 
median of 0.2 human cases (rounded down to zero) and 0.8 chicken exposures (rounded up to 1). See additional file 3 for cor-
responding animation.Page 8 of 12
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Result sensitivity relative to the R0-value as it would have been measured in Ho Chi Minh CityFig re 5
Result sensitivity relative to the R0-value as it would have been measured in Ho Chi Minh City. Light gray lines 
show the variation in a particular epidemiological indicator as a function of R0. The other coloured lines are moving averages 
over nearby R0-values. The top two panels show the size of the epidemic and the time taken for it to peak, which always have 
a predictable relationship to R0. The bottom two panels show how animal exposure increases and how the epidemic becomes 
more rural as R0 increases. Note that with higher R0, not only does the risk to domestic animal owners increase but the rela-
tive risk of an owner to a non-owner also increases (not shown).
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school closure on reducing the number of transmissions
[28-31]. Climate and other seasonally variable factors
may also have acted to limit transmission in temperate
regions [32,33]. Seasonal factors are likely to have less
influence in tropical regions where the seasonality of
influenza transmission is much less marked [4].
In the absence of effective interventions, we predict a large
amount of contact between infected humans and animals
that might harbour other influenza viruses, including
HPAI. In fact, we believe our model probably underesti-
mates the amount of contact between infected human and
animals for three reasons. First, we divided the total
number of human cases by the number of people per
household in order to derive an estimate of the number of
households with an infectious case. We did this to avoid
over counting animals that were exposed to multiple
infected individuals in the same household, but this is a
very conservative correction. Second, domestic animal
production is concentrated close to urban centres, where
population densities are higher than average. Third, we
did not model contacts which occurring in live poultry
markets or commercial farms.
The danger of human-animal contact lies in the opportu-
nity for reassortment among different influenza subtypes.
It is well known that influenza reassorts in humans [34],
that pigs play an important role in reassortment of
human/avian/swine influenza viruses [35-37] and that
the history of avian influenza viruses includes multiple
reassortment events [38,39]. However, very little is known
about the potential of human influenza viruses to jump to
animals, since most studies to date have focused on ani-
mal influenza activity and the risk it poses to humans [40-
42]. Pandemic H1N1 has already been detected in swine
and, since poultry and swine populations in Asia may har-
bour many different subtypes of influenza (at least H4,
H5, H6, H7, H9, H11, H12), the generation of a new sub-
type through a reassortment event is a real possibility
[43,44] [personal communication, Ken Inui].
Although these opportunities for genetic reassortment are
not unique, the current influenza landscape contains wor-
rying features. Widespread epidemics of novel H1N1 are
likely in tropical countries where HPAI is endemic and
seasonal influenza transmission is complex and sus-
tained, without the seasonal bottlenecks that characterize
transmission in temperate regions [4,33]. The overall
diversity of influenza viruses in southeastern Asia ensures
that an epidemic of the novel H1N1 will create many
opportunities for co-infection with other subtypes circu-
lating in the region. Genetic and antigenic data suggest
that Asia is a key source of influenza viruses that cause sea-
sonal outbreaks in the northern and southern hemi-
spheres [45]. This region, therefore, possesses the
conditions necessary for the genesis and dissemination of
new influenza variants [33,45]. Finally, the introduction
of H1N1 into southeastern Asia creates an optimal evolu-
tionarily environment for the virus, where re-assortment
is neither too frequent nor too rare [46]. This means the
virus receives the benefits of limited reassortment (a
genetic novelty) but not the penalty of high levels of reas-
sortment (the breaking apart of beneficial gene combina-
tions).
Our model provides a rough picture of what might hap-
pen in Vietnam, but it includes many assumptions, uncer-
tainties and un-modelled heterogeneities which require
that the results be interpreted with caution. Although
changes in human demography and migration over the
past 40 years may make a pandemic more difficult to con-
trol, the same period has seen massive advances in tech-
nology and communication that allow us to monitor and
predict this pandemic as never before. Mathematical mod-
els are one tool, but a criticism of these models is that the
predictions are not subsequently tested against real out-
break data [47]. Our model development has coincided
with the arrival of H1N1 in Vietnam and we are planning
to track the progression of the outbreak in Vietnam in an
attempt at real-time model validation and diagnostics.
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